




The critical discussions of the concept of a creator contained in several 
Madhyamika texts lack the characteristics we would expect of a Madhyamika 
analysis. In the pages that follow 1 will elaborate on this point, with attention 
paid to three texts in particular, and then go on to suggest what I think could be 
adequately characterized as a Madhyamika critique of creation ex nihilo. The 
texts to come under discussion are the Bodhicarydvatara of Santideva, the 
Twelve-Gate Treatise, attributed to Nagarjuna, and a short piece entitled 
“Refutation of the View of God being the Creator of the World and of Vi$qu 
being the Sole Creator of the Whole World,” also attributed to Nagarjuna.1
1 Relevant passages from the BodhicaryUvatHra of Santideva arc to be found in a 
partial translation by Michael J. Sweet, “SSntideva and the Madhyamika: The 
PrajfiSparamita-Pariccheda of the Bodhicarydvatara,” unpublished dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976, pp. 133-137. A complete translation is in 
Marion L. Matics, Entering The Path of Enlightenment (London: Collier, MacMillan 
Ltd., 1970).
The Twelve-Gate Treatise is translated in Cheng Hsueh-li, “An Expository and 
Critical Study of Madhyamika Philosophy From Chinese Sources,” unpublished 
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974. Chapter X is on pages 261-270.
“I£vara-kartrtva-nirikrtib-vi$riob-ekakartrtva-nirakajjarp nama” was translated 
from the Sanskrit into Russian by Th. Stcherbatsky, and from the Russian into 
English by Harish C. Gupta in Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky, n.d., ed. by Debiprasad Chat- 
topadhyaya, pp. 3-15. This edition contains the Sanskrit original, a romanized trans­
literation of the original Sanskrit, and translations in both Tibetan and English.
Since questions of interpretation of Madhyamika texts have traditionally 
created such divergent opinion, and since I wish to suggest what is and is not 
of genuine Madhyamika flavor, it is necessary to offer at least a brief account 
of what 1 take to be the central Madhyamika position. The enterprise begins, 
then, with an analysis of select passages from Nagarjuna’s Miilamadhyami- 





The most important of Nagaijuna’s concepts is “Sunyata.” That we may say 
this is evidenced by the central role played by the concept in his thought:
14. When emptiness “works,” then everything in
existence “works.”
If emptiness does not “work,” then all 
existence does not work. [Mmk, xxiv]
70. All things prevail for him for whom 
emptiness prevails;
Nothing whatever prevails for him for whom
emptiness (does not prevail]. [Vv]
From these two passages alone it is clear that “SOnyata” is for Nagaijuna perhaps 
the most important Buddhist concept or category. He also gives another in­
dication of the role played by Silnyata in the context of a discussion of the 
impossibility of holding views (drsfi):
29. Because of the emptiness of all existing things,
How will the views about “eternity,” etc., 
come into existence, about what, of 
whom, and of what kind? [Mmk, xxvu]
It is the centrality of “Sunyata,” more than anything else, that gives 
Nagaijuna’s work its distinctive character. Most of the analyses conducted 
throughout Mmk are attempts by N&garjuna to demonstrate the appropriateness 
of saying that all things are empty. To capture that which distinguishes the 
Madhyamika position from most others it is necessary to understand what it 
means to say that all things are sunya.
What, then, is the meaning of “Sunyata”? What does it mean to say that all 
things are empty? Presumably, if all things are empty, they are empty of some­
thing. That is, an attempt is being made to say that a certain way of under­
standing the nature of things is not the case. What all things are empty of is 
own-being (svabhava). The Indian concept of svabhava is roughly equivalent to 
our own traditional notion of substance. Svabhava is that which is distinguished 
from its own attributes, characteristics and relations in a very specific way. 
It is that which has attributes and characteristics, that which stands in relation.
Ill
2 Passages cited from both the Mdlamadhyamikakarikas and Vigrahavyavartani 
are from the translation by Frederick J. Strong, A Study in Religious
Meaning (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 183—227.
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Certain Buddhist sects which flourished before and during Nagaijuna’s time 
held that existing things were composed of dharmas (elements), but that these 
dharmas themselves must have unique svabhava. The dharmas had character­
istics, or marks (lak$ana), but these marks, as well as the relations in which the 
dharmas stood, were external to the dharma itself. Dharmas were basic partic­
ulars; they were the ontological simples which combined in various ways to 
construct the objects of the world. Buddhist ontology was, to a large extent, 
atomistic.
In one way, then, “svabhava” is meant to convey something like substance. 
It is a self-existent thing. It exists independently of its marks and relations. 
It is that in which marks inhere and that which is in relation. For NAgArjuna, 
and the Madhyamika in general, that which is &Onya is that which lacks svabhAva, 
it is something empty of own-being. To say that all things are empty is to deny 
a substance/attribute perspective as an adequate ontological conception.
Nagarjuna discusses the concept of own-being in Chapter xv of Mmk, which 
is entitled “SvabhAva parik$A,” “An Analysis of Own-Being,” or as Frederick 
Streng translates it, “An Analysis of a Self-Existent Thing.” Nagaijuna argues 
in this chapter that svabhava is not possible. He remarks that:
1. The production of a self-existent thing by a conditioning cause is 
not possible,
[For] being produced through dependence on a cause, a self-existent 
thing would be “something which is produced.”
2. How, indeed, will a self-existent thing become “something which is 
produced”?
Certainly, a self-existent thing [by definition] is “not-produced” and is 
independent of anything else. [Mmk, xv]
His point is simply that svabhava, as that which is self-existent, could not, by 
definition, be produced by causes. If it could not be produced by causes, it 
could not originate, it could not come into being. If it is by definition indepen­
dent of causal interaction, not only could it not come into being, but it could 
not go out of being either. On the supposition of svabhava, it would not be 
true of anything that it either came to be or ceased to be:
3. If there is an absence of a self-existent thing, how will an other-existent 
thing come into being?
Certainly the self-existence of an other-existent thing is called “other- 
existence.”




Since people call the other-existence of an existent thing a “non­
existent thing.” [Mmk, xv]
If svabhava were the case, then we would be faced with an etemalism. Any 
sort of change and movement would be ruled out. However, Nagarjuna takes 
pains to point out that to deny svabhava is not to argue for the non-being of 
things, since the notion of non-being, or what he calls “other-existence,” is itself 
a correlative of own-being, of self-existence. Thus he wants to deny the very 
terms in which the assertion of self-existence and other-existence, or being and 
non-being, is made. He wants to reject altogether an ontology that takes as its 
fundamental categories being and non-being:
6. Those who perceive self-existence and other-existence,
and an existent thing and a non-existent thing, 
Do not perceive the true nature of the Buddha's teaching.
7. In “The Instructions of Katyayana” both “it is” and
“it is not” are opposed.
By the Glorious One, who has ascertained the meaning 
of “existent” and “non-existent.”
10. “It is” is a notion of eternity. “It is not” is
a nihilistic view.
Therefore, one who is wise does not have recourse
to “being” or “non-being.” [Mmk, xv]
If Nagarjuna rejects an ontology based on the categories of being and non- 
being, and on the related distinction between substance and attribute, what sort 
of ontological conception is operative in his work? We have seen the negative 
meaning of the claim that all things are empty, viz., that they lack own-being. 
But what are the positive implications of this claim? What is it that is true of all 
things if they are sunya? Nagaijuna indicates the positive meaning of Sunyata 
in several passages:
22. The “being dependent nature” of existing things:
that is called “emptiness.”
That which has a nature of “being dependent”—
of that there is a non-self-existent nature. [Vv]
18. The “originating dependently” we call “emptiness”;
This apprehension, i.e., taking into account [all 
other things], is the understanding of the middle way.




No dharma whatever exists which is not empty.
36. You deny all mundane and customary activities 
When you deny emptiness [in the sense of] 
dependent co-origination. [Mmk, xxiv]
If all things are empty, then all things lack svabhava. If all things lack svabhava, 
then all things prevail through dependent co-origination (pratitya-samutpada). 
The meaning of “SQnyata,” then, is equivalent to the meaning of “pratitya- 
samutpada.” But the latter concept must mean something different for NagSijuna 
than it did for the abhidharmists. Pratitya-samutpada was a principle of causa­
tion in the abhidharmic literature, but it was grounded in an atomistic dharma 
theory. Unlike that which dharmas served to constitute, they themselves did not 
lack svabhava. But Nagaijuna has denied the possibility of svabhava, so he 
could not have followed completely the abhidharmists in their conception of 
pratitya-sam utpAda.
What, then, does “pratitya-samutpada” mean for Nagarjuna? We have 
already seen that “^iinyatA” is equivalent to “pratitya-samutpada,” and that 
“Stinyata” is the central category of Nagarjuna’s thought. “Pratitya-samutpada” 
must then hold an equally central position. If dependent co-origination does not 
mean a causal relation between self-existent things, then it must mean that what 
is is itself a function of the conditions of which it consists. Dependent co­
origination means that what is consists of conditions in certain relations to one 
another, and the conditions themselves are dependently co-originated. Streng 
suggests a similar interpretation:
Considered in the context of emptiness, co-originating dependently loses its 
meaning as the link between two “things”; rather it becomes the form for 
expressing the phenomenal “becoming” as the lack of any self-sufficient, 
independent reality.3
3 Ibid., p. 63.
To say that what is is dependently co-originated is to deny self-existence to 
anything, but it is not to deny the world. There are objects, events, people, etc., 
but they are not self-existent things. They are complexes that arise and prevail 
in a set of conditions. The conditions are themselves complexes, which is to say 
that they are dependently co-originated. Sunyata, then, is a conception that 
does not admit of ontological simples, and the conditions which comprise 
complexes are the conditions that they are, which is to say they have the nature 
that they have, at least in part by virtue of the complexes they give use to.
Chapters n through xxi of Mmk, with the exception of Chapter xv, are appli­
cations of Nagarjuna’s conception of Sunyata and pratitya-samutpada to a series 
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of prominent Buddhist concepts and terms. Chapters I and xv are not included 
under this rubric since together they provide the foundations on which the 
other analyses rest. The features of Buddhist thought considered in these 
nineteen chapters are shown to be incomprehensible if svabhava is postu­
lated. The conclusion should presumably be that philosophic analysis in the 
Buddhist spirit is impossible if one supposes a self-existent thing or its cor­
relative notion of an ontological simple. The world, including the fact of 
suffering and the possibility of release from it, is intelligible only in terms of 
emptiness and dependent co-origination. We will briefly examine Chapter n, 
“An Analysis of ‘Going to* ” (gatagata parik$a), since it is in many ways a 
paradigm for the others of this section of the text. The analysis of Chapter n 
will show the ways in which the interpretation of Sunyata just offered accords 
with Nagarjuna’s own remarks.
In the analysis of “going to,” Nagarjuna tries to show that when considered as 
self-existent entities, there can be no “goer,” no “act of going” and no “destina­
tion gone to.” These three factors of motion are so intricately bound up with 
and determined by one another that the distinctions between them can only 
make sense if they are seen in their complex interrelations. NSgarjuna makes 
this point in the following passages:
7. If there is no going without a “goer,”
How will the “goer” come into being when there is 
no “going”?
8. The “goer” does not go; consequently a “non-goer”
certainly does not go.
What third [possibility] goes other than the “goer” 
and “non-goer”?
10. Those who hold the view that the “goer** goes must
(falsely] conclude
That there is a “goer” without the “act of going”
since the “act of going” is obtained by a “goer.” [Mmk, it]
There can be no “goer” as distinct from the “act of going,” since the one is 
conditioned by the other. A “goer,” then, as a self-existent entity, is not possible. 
Verses 12-14 make a similar point with respect to the “state of going to” and 
“that which is gone to.*’ All three distinctions are determined by a web of 
interrelations and conditioning factors.
But Nagaijuna is careful not to overstate his case. On the one hand he wants 
to say that if we conceive of a “goer,” etc., as a self-existent thing, we run into 
serious conceptual difficulties. On the other hand, he does not want to say that 
a “goer,” the “act of going” and the “destination gone to” are indistinguishable:
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18. Thus it does not obtain that the “goer” is simply “what
is going.”
Likewise it does not obtain that: “Then the ‘goer’ is 
something other than what is in the ‘process of going’.”
19. And if the ‘act of going’ and the ‘goer’ are identical,
The fallacy logically follows that the “person acting” 
and the action are identical.
20. Alternatively, if the “goer” is different from the
“process of going,”
The “act of going” would exist without the “goer” 
and the “goer” would exist without the “act of going.”
21. Neither the identity nor the essential difference is
established regarding the two [conceptions “goer” and 
“act of going”].
If these two [alternatives] are not established, in
what way is [this problem] to be understood? [Mmk, n]
Nagarjuna does not suggest that we cannot distinguish between a “goer,” the 
“act of going” and the “destination gone to.” He in fact says that “Indeed 
someone goes somewhere” (Mmk, ii, 22). Clearly, then, the point is not to say 
that there are no such things as “goers,” etc., or that the distinction is in some 
way an artificial one. The point appears to be that there is a certain way of 
understanding what a “goer,” etc., is, and if anything the artificial notion is the 
distinction between the “goer,” etc., as self-existent things. They are not entirely 
separate things, since they arise through mutual conditioning and determination. 
At the same time, though, Nagarjuna insists that they are not identical either.
We can see in the analysis of “going to” one of the characteristic features 
of NSgarjuna’s method. He argues that the “act of going” and the “goer” can­
not be identical, but they cannot be different either. These two claims represent 
half of the fourfold negation, which Nagarjuna uses at a number of points. 
The four “comers” of the dialectic, if we were to apply them to the analysis of 
“going to,” would be as follows: 1) It is not the case that “the act of going” and 
the “goer” are identical; 2) It is not the case that they are different; 3) It is not 
the case that they are both identical and different; and 4) It is not the case that 
they are neither identical nor different. It appears that the dialectic disallows any 
claim at all concerning the subject under consideration, thus leading some 
scholars to interpret its impact as leading us towards an intuitive insight that 
transcends the conceptual limits of logic and language. On the interpretation of 
Nagarjuna that we are offering, though, the dialectic does not point to a non- 
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cognitive intuition, but rather it compels us to revise the general categories in 
terms of which we are inclined to think about things. The “act of going” and the 
“goer” are not identical, since our ordinary experience gives us every reason to 
distinguish them. As NSgarjuna says, “Indeed someone goes somewhere.” At 
the same time, though, they are not different, since each is at least part of what 
constitutes the other. They are not both, that is, in the same respect, because that 
is contradictory, and they are not neither, since we appear to have good reason 
to accept, at least to some extent, what is implied by both difference and identity.
Language tends to develop in a manner such that the uses of certain terms tend 
to force us into a specific perspective. Words take on collectively recognized 
meanings and connotations. To say that the “goer” and the “act of going” are 
identical would incline us to say that the terms are simply two different ways of 
speaking about the same thing. To say that they are different implies that 
whatever relations that obtain between them are in some way extrinsic to their 
essential natures. Neither of these implications or connotations are acceptable, 
yet both terms seem to contain a glimmer of what we do want to say about 
the “goer” and the “act of going.” They are neither entirely acceptable nor 
objectionable, and this is so because of the ordinary connotations we take 
them to have. Nftg&ijuna, in his use of the dialectic, is attempting to drive home 
the point that a revision in our general way of understanding things is required. 
It is required because both possibilities, i.e., difference and identity, are rooted, 
as far as our understanding of them goes, in a tendency to understand the 
objects and events of the world as self-existent, as having own-being. The terms 
“difference” and “identity” do not allow us to characterize sufficiently well the 
“goer” and the “act of going” in the way that we need to.
We need to be careful, though. The point is not that we are to transcend 
difference and identity, whatever that would amount to. Rather we need to 
realign our thinking so that what seems intuitively correct about the distinction 
between difference and identity is maintained while the undesirable implications 
of the terms are avoided. We must reject the ontology, and it is one which the 
terms seem to force on us, that is based on the svabhava of individuals and the 
correlative distinction between internal and external relations. We must indeed 
maintain a distinction between the “goer” and the “act of going,” but we can 
only do so by understanding each as constitutive of the other. The “goer” is a 
“goer” insofar as it participates in the “act of going.” Participation in the “act 
of going” is what makes this particular complex a “goer” and not something else.
The analysis of “going to” in Chapter u of Mmk nicely illustrates the general 
points Nagarjuna wants to make. If we understand the “goer,”etc., as having 
svabhava, then they are not even possible. But since “someone goes somewhere,” 
that is, since we are not justified in rejecting the distinctions altogether, we must 
revise our conceptual categories in order to adequately account for them. It is to 
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this revision that the dialectic and the fundamental categories of SQnyata and 
pratitya-samutpada point
ii
This sketchy overview of Nagarjuna’s ontology will allow us to take a 
closer look at the notion of creation ex nihilo from a MIdhyamika perspective. 
We will attempt, in the end, a development of NSg&juna’s central ontological 
conceptions insofar as they have a bearing on the question of God, especially 
God as creator. There is always a danger in taking a concept like God out of 
its natural home, which consists essentially of religions that had their origins 
in the Near East, and transporting them into very different traditions. The 
Indian religious milieu did not have a notion of God in the same sense as did 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. They did, however, have a very clear notion 
of a creator, so while the Indian traditions did not concern themselves with 
God in the Western sense of the term, they were concerned with the idea of 
creation. Several Indian religious and philosophical traditions, the Samkhya 
and Nyiya for example, explicitly held to the view that there is a creator. While 
it may not be entirely proper, then, to speak of God in connection with 
Indian religious traditions, it is nevertheless acceptable to address the issue of a 
creator.
Since the concept of a creator was very much in the religious and philosophic 
air of classical India, there is a fair amount of literature on the subject. There 
are texts in which the concept of a creator is defended, and there are others in 
which it is criticized. Among the latter group are a small number of Madhyamika 
texts in which attempts are made to refute the concept of a creator. Before 
developing our own Madhyamika critique of the concept of a creator, we will 
briefly examine the refutations contained in these other Madhyamika texts. We 
will find that arguments presented in these other texts for the most part lack 
a distinctively Madhyamika flavor. This remains to be shown, of course, but 
we can anticipate a bit by saying that it is because these arguments are in general 
not properly Midhyamika in character that there is still a need to develop such 
arguments from Nagarjuna’s own general ontological remarks.
We will look at three Madhyamika texts. The first is the Bodhicaryavatara of 
Santideva, Chapter ix of which contains several refutations of a creator. The 
second text we will examine is the Twelve-Gate Treatise, the Chinese Madhyamika 
text which is attributed to Nagarjuna but for which we have not yet found a 
Sanskrit original. In Chapter x of that Treatise there are no less than fourteen 
separate arguments designed to show that there cannot be a creator. The third 
text we will consider is a very short piece which is rarely ever mentioned in the 
secondary literature. It is a text concerned solely with the issue of creation, and 
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is attributed to Nagarjuna. The title of the text has been translated into English 
as “Refutation of the View of God being the Creator of the World and of the 
View of Vis&u being the Sole Creator of the Whole World,” and there are 
versions extant in both Sanskrit and Tibetan.
One would expect that a Midhyamika critique of a creator would make 
significant use of the concept of £Qnyata. In the Bodhicaryavatdra, though, 
Sintideva offers several different refutations of a creator, none of which men­
tion either Silnyata or pratltya-samutpada. The arguments are offered in Chapter 
ix, verses 119—126, and they are directed against the Nyaya school of Hinduism. 
There are actually three main arguments. The first, from verses 119—121, asks 
precisely what it is that the Nyaya is referring to when it suggests that there is 
a Lord that has created the universe? Santideva says that the Lord cannot be 
the elements out of which the world is composed, since these do not have any 
of the qualities that the Nyaya also attributes to the creator, qualities such as 
eternality, purity, etc. He goes on to warn the Naiyayika that they cannot 
retreat from the question by saying that the nature of the creator is incomprehen­
sible, since to do that would be to remove whatever grounds there might be on 
which to base the claim that there is a creator in the first place. These remarks 
do not constitute an argument against the creator, but they do suggest to the 
Nyaya that it may well in the end not have a coherent concept of what it means 
to say that the Lord has created the universe.
Santideva (verses 122-123) then asks what this Lord could possibly create? 
On the Nyaya’s own view, the self is eternal, as is the world, since it holds that the 
constituent elements of the world are eternal. But of course if the self and the 
world are both eternal, then neither could have been created. Santideva further 
points out that the Lord could not have created knowledge, joy or pain either. 
Knowledge, he says, is a function of the knower’s relation to the known, while 
joy and pain are consequences of our own activities. In neither case is there any 
room, and certainly not a need, for a creator.
Santideva’s third argument (verses 124-126) comes closest of the three to 
incorporating characteristically Madhyamika points, but even here he falls 
short of a comprehensive, explicit analysis. The question he asks is why, if there 
is a creator of all things, creation does not take place all at once? In other 
words, why does the Lord not create everything all at once? If creation occurs 
little by little, then what is created is contingent. But if the entire creation is the 
Lord’s product, on what could the created be contingent? Sintideva points out 
that if an effect depends on the totality of its causes, then God could not be the 
sole creator, since in the presence of the totality of causes God could not fail to 
create. On the other hand, in the absence of the totality of causes, God would 
not have the power to create. We might claim that the Lord creates as a function 
of his own desire, but this, Santideva suggests, would be equally absurd. If the
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Lord creates without desire, then he is under the control of something else. If 
he creates with desire, then he is dependent on the desire itself. In neither case 
could we say that the Lord is the creator of all there is.
This last argument resembles a genuine MAdhyamika critique since it hints 
at the interrelations among an actor, any action, and that which is acted upon. 
These relations are constitutive of all three, as we have seen in the analysis of 
Chapter u of Mmk. SAntideva, though, fails to make any of these points explicit 
and therefore fails to offer as powerful a critique of a creator as the MAdhyamika 
is capable of.
The second text to consider is the Twelve-Gate Treatise. Although the work is 
attributed to NAgArjuna, there is some question over its actual authorship * But 
regardless of who actually wrote the text, it is clearly a MAdhyamika work, and 
consequently its critiques of a creator are of interest to us. Chapter x of the 
Treatise contains fourteen different arguments against the possibility of a 
creator. Like the Bodhicaryavatara, none of the arguments work out in any 
detail a specifically MAdhyamika critique. Some of them do come a bit closer than 
$Antideva’s, though, since four of the arguments are actually designed to show 
that a creator could not be self-existent. Only one of them actually states that 
creation would only be possible if the creator were self-existent. The other 
three leave this crucial point unstated. The third argument presented, for 
example, asks the question “If God were a creator, who created him?” (p. 265). 
He could not create himself, since that is impossible, and he could not be created, 
because if he were then he would not be self-existent. The argument does not 
go on to show, as one might expect, that a creator must be self-existent, and that 
such a thing is not possible. It is precisely the latter that a sufficiently well 
developed MAdhyamika critique of a creator must show. The remainder of the 
arguments in the Twelve-Gate Treatise are even less interesting from a Madhya- 
mika point of view, and we need not go into them here.
The last work that demands treatment is the very short piece mentioned 
earlier. According to Stcherbatsky the work has been attributed to Nagarjuna, 
and it is devoted entirely to a refutation of a creator.* 5 The most striking thing 
about this work is that it contains almost nothing one would expect Nagarjuna 
to say on the subject of a creator. This may itself be evidence that Nagarjuna 
had little if anything to do with the text.
* Cf. Richard A. Gard, “On the Authenticity of the Pai-Lun and Shih-Erh-Men-
Lun,” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. II, No. 2 (March, 1954), pp. 742-751.
5 Cf. Chattopadhyaya, p. 3-4.
There are three basic arguments. The first says that a creator creates either 
that which is existent or that which is not existent. He cannot create that which is 
existent since it has no need of a creator; it already exists. On the other hand, 
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a creator could not create the non-existent either. We are given the examples of 
oil crushed from sand, or wool on a tortoise as instances of that which is non­
existent, and the author suggests that these could not be created since we know 
them to be non-existent.
The author goes on to suggest that perhaps the creator makes that which is 
non-existent existent. But this is impossible, it is claimed, since the two are 
mutually exclusive concepts. That which exists cannot become non-existent, and 
that which is non-existent cannot come to exist.
These two arguments should give us reason to pause. In the first place they are 
rooted firmly in two of the concepts Nfigaijuna explicitly rejects in Mmk, 
existence and non-existence. Nagarjuna has made it clear that these concepts are 
not appropriate for the sort of philosophic analysis in which he was interested. 
A second point we should note is that these arguments, and especially the second, 
presuppose two other concepts NigSrjuna explicitly rejected, eternalism and 
nihilism. It is assumed that what exists can never not exist, and vice versa. These 
are conceptions directly antithetical to the Madhyamika viewpoint as developed 
in Mmk. We can say that whatever the independent merits of these arguments, 
and they appear to be minimal, they do not have the characteristics of 
a Mfidhyamika critique.
The third argument in the text is similar in some respects to the one we men­
tioned from the Twelve-Gate Treatise. The question is asked whether the creator 
is himself bom or unborn. He cannot create if he is unborn, since the unborn, 
for example, “the son of a barren woman,” are not capable of action. If the 
creator is bom, we must ask whether he is bom from himself, from something 
else or both. He could not have created himself, since “one’s own actions 
cannot relate to one’s own self.” On the other hand, he could not have originated 
from something else, since then he would not be the creator of all that is. Finally, 
he could not be bom from both, since that would involve both fallacies. There­
fore the creator can be neither bora nor unborn.
This last argument contains, like its counterpart in the Twelve-Gate Treatise, 
a glimmer of a Mfidhyamika critique. It is suggested that the creator could not 
have originated from something other than itself because it could then not be 
said to create that from which it originates. In other words, a creator is only 
possible if it is self-existent. Since self-existence is presumably not possible, then 
neither is a creator.
It is clear that none of the three texts contain what could justifiably be called 
an explicit and sufficiently developed critique of a creator along Madhyamika 
lines. There are certain features a Madhyamika critique should have. Since the 
principles of liinyata and pratitya-samutpada are at the heart of the Madhyamika 
ontology, a critique of a creator along Mfidhyamika lines should incorporate 
those principles. Many of the chapters of Mmk provide adequate models for an 
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analysis of the possibility of a creator. Just as Nagaijuna speaks of a goer, the 
act of going and that which is gone to, we can just as easily analyze the concepts 
of a creator, the act of creation and that which is created. The following section 
is an attempt to develop the implications of Nagarjuna’s general ontology for 
the concept of a creator.
in
The argument is a fairly simple one. If there is a creator ex nihilo, then that 
creator is either SQnya or aSunya. A creator ex nihilo cannot be Sunya, nor can it 
be aSQnya. Therefore, a creator ex nihilo is not possible. What needs to be shown 
is that a creator could be neither SOnya nor aiQnya.
As we have already seen, many of the chapters of Mmk are designed to show 
that such concepts as a “goer” or “destination” cannot designate anything self- 
existent. That which is not self-existent is dependently co-originated, which is 
to say it is sunya. We can substitute the concept of a creator for any of those 
Nagarjuna chose to discuss in Mmk itself.
We should perhaps supply a brief review of Nagarjuna’s remarks concerning 
a “goer,” the process of “going” and “that which is gone to.” NSgaijuna’s 
approach to these concepts is to show that if we conceive of them as self-existent, 
then they would not be possible. However, since there is no reason to deny and 
every reason to affirm a “goer,” etc., it must be the case that none of them are 
self-existent If they are not self-existent they must then be understood in 
terms of pratitya-samutpada and SQnyata. Nagarjuna is careful to warn us, 
though, that while we cannot take a “goer,” “going” and “that which is gone 
to” as essentially distinct from one another, we cannot treat them as identical 
either. It is the concept of Sunyata that allows us to tread a middle path between 
identity and difference.
How do we apply this kind of analysis to the concept of a creator ex nihilo? 
If we attempt to understand a creator as self-existent, we would have to say that 
the character or the nature of the creator is not a function of the creator’s 
relation to its creation, but rather is self-determined. What the creator is is deter­
mined by svabhava, or self-nature. The creator is what it is by virtue of its own 
intrinsic essence. But NSgSijuna asks with respect to a “goer” how, “if there is 
no going without a ‘goer’,” it would be possible for a “goer” to “come into 
being when there is no ‘going’?” (Mmk, h, 7). We can make the same point with 
respect to a creator. If there is no act of creation without a creator, it is equally 
true that there is no creator without an act of creation. If this is the case, then 
part of what it is to be a creator ex nihilo is determined by an act of creation, and 
by that which is created as well. If this is the case, then we cannot say of the 
creator that what it is, its nature, is fully determined solely by its ownsvabhSva.
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If a creator is what it is at least in part by virtue of its relation to both the act of 
creation and that which is created, then the creator’s nature is determined, or 
conditioned, by something other than itself. But this contradicts the conception 
of the creator as self-existent, and it in addition articulates what it would mean 
to say that a creator is Siinya.
A creator, then, cannot be understood apart from an act of creation and 
whatever is created by that act. This is equivalent to saying that a creator, 
an act of creation and that which is created cannot be distinguished from one 
another on the basis of an individual essence of each. If we turn again to 
Nagarjuna’s remarks concerning a “goer,” we find that while a “goer,” etc., 
cannot be essentially distinguished from one another, they should not be under­
stood as identical either:
18. Thus it does not obtain that the “goer” is
simply “what is going.”
Likewise it does not obtain that: “Then the
‘goer* is something other than what is in the
[Mmk, n]
By the same token, we would have to say that while a creator would not be 
essentially distinct from a creation and what is created, it would not be proper 
to take them as identical either.
In the case of the “goer,” “going” and “that which is gone to,” the partial 
difference of and the constitutive relations among the three are what determine 
their natures as Siinya. In the same way we would want to distinguish a creator, 
the act of creation and that created from one another, but it is only possible to 
understand each by conceiving of them as constituted at least in part by the 
others. In other words, if we were to seriously entertain the concept of a creator 
ex nihilo, we would have to understand it as being SOnya. It is not possible, on 
Madhyamika grounds, for a creator ex nihilo to be a^Qnya.
But we have claimed that it is equally impossible for a creator ex nihilo to be 
£finya. The very concept of a creator ex nihilo requires that it be intelligible in 
terms of itself alone. If a creator is to create out of nothing, then it must be 
possible to characterize the creator without reference either to the act of creation 
or to whatever is created. If the nature of a creator is determined by the act of 
creation and what is created, then a creator requires both the act of creation and 
that created to even be what it is. But if a creator is what it is only by virtue of 
its act of creation and what is created, then the concept of a creator creating out 
of nothing becomes incoherent. Without the act of creation and whatever is 
created, the creator could not even be, let alone be a creator ex nihilo. It is im­
possible, then, to conceive of a creator ex nihilo as £unya.
From a Madhyamika point of view, a creator can be neither SOnya nor aiunya.
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Since these two are the only possible alternatives, we can conclude that a creator 
ex nihilo is not possible. Precisely the same analysis can be applied to the con­
ception of a preserver of what is and a destroyer of what is, if we wish to extend 
the analysis to other characteristic features of God. A preserver can no more 
preserve the world than the world preserves it, since the act of preservation and 
that which is preserved constitute the preserver itself. In a similar way, a destroyer 
cannot destroy the world, since to do so would be to destroy itself.
To conclude, Nagaijuna’s general ontology generates a powerful critique of 
the creator ex nihilo, a critique which classical Madhyamika texts failed to draw 
to its fullest extent.
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